At a special meeting on Wednesday, the Fidesz-led council of the Budapest district in which the memorial will be erected voted in favour of the plan. The council leader, Antal Rogan, said that it had his approval because it was not just about the occupation, but because "we are erecting a monument to all the victims, including hundreds of thousands of Holocaust victims - those who were deported, abused and murdered".
But a leading member of the Socialist Party, Csaba Horvath, said that the government's plans risked "dividing society and creating a fresh scandal by falsifying history". Szabolcs Kerek-Barczy, a member of the leadership of the left-wing Democratic Coalition, said that by erecting the monument, Fidesz would be sending "a symbolic gesture to the current Hungarian far-right and to neo-Nazis".
Critics say the government is focusing on the last year or so of the war, when Hungary was occupied by German troops after its leadership attempted to make peace with the Allies, and so airbrushing the previous years of collaboration with the Nazis. In an interview with the independent Hungarian TV channel ATV , Mr Kerek-Barczy also said that the plan was a deliberate attempt on the part of the government "to gain far-right votes - the votes of neo-Nazis are valuable to them too".
Jobbik is currently the third largest party in the Hungarian parliament, and many analysts see Fidesz's efforts to woo nationalist voters as part of a campaign to prevent a large part of its natural support base from ebbing away to Jobbik in the next election.
A group of 26 leading Hungarian historians has issued an open letter - published on the Galamus news and opinion website - in which they protested against the plan, saying that: "The memorial falsifies an important period of our history, and relativises the Holocaust in Hungary. Accordingly, already in the beginning of the s, Germany signed commercial treaties with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary on the mutual basis of the most favoured nation clause.
Because of certain prolonged disputes regarding the —18 German occupation of Romania, Berlin signed such a treaty with Bucharest only in At the same time, Germany was only the third most important trading partner for Hungary and Yugoslavia. This hierarchy was not accidental. Abundant in certain raw materials, Romania and Yugoslavia — regardless of their political allegiance to the French alliance system — became the important trading partners of Germany in South-East Europe.
On the other hand, Hungary and Bulgaria primarily became important as markets and agricultural producers and played a less important role in German thought. Berlin traditionally considered the German minorities, descendants and German-speaking population in the region as the integral part of the German nation.
Except for Bulgaria, where they lived in only very small numbers, there were significant German minorities in all three South-East European countries: , 3. Their survival and strengthening, for very practical purposes, is our primary aim.
Their role in the united German nation is to serve as economic, political and cultural links between the German Reich and those other countries where they live. If we do not intervene, we would surely lose this cultural base in South-East Europe. The result of this would not only be the collapse of our cultural expansion politics in South-East Europe, but a very significant economic impairment to the German nation as a whole.
The Saxons in Transylvania constitute such a core of Germandom there, which has primary significance towards our economic policy in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The German foreign political aim to strengthen German minorities cannot be signified in trade relations only. However, from the available fragmentary evidence, it can be argued that the funds provided by Berlin for the moral and political support of German schools, press and churches, as well as the several economic and cultural associations, and education of the minority elite scholarships all played a significant role.
This was the case regardless of the fact that, compared to the German minorities living in Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic region Grenzdeutsche , South-East Europe Auslandsdeutsche or Volksdeutsche always lacked priority in official policy.
Until , German foreign policy kept its distance from meddling in the politics of the region, and the antagonisms of the states in South-East Europe. We will follow this policy, unless certain power reshuffles occur.
Our aim is to maintain good relations with all countries in the Balkans. Also it pursued the final settlement of German reparations, restoration of German sovereignty in the Saar and the Rhineland, the peaceful revision of the Eastern frontiers, and the Anschluss. A more active German policy in the region would have eventually clashed with French Danubian and Balkan strategy, and would have compromised current German reconciliatory tendencies.
Paris, at least in words, showed a certain leniency towards the unification of Danzig and Germany, and the elimination of the Polish Corridor, which cut Prussia into two. However, nobody expected it to concede to the idea of a German sphere of influence stretching from the North Sea to the Black Sea.
When the Hungarians understood, they adopted an offended stance. Budapest attempted to deal with the German leadership as an equal partner or, at least, in accordance with primus inter pares principle with which, it also perceived its neighbours.
It necessarily had to realise this was a pipedream. Gaining momentum after the Treaty of Eternal Friendship signed with Italy, Hungary renewed its diplomatic efforts for achieving a political collaboration with Germany in —28, and also for the creation of a German-Italian-Austro-Hungarian revisionist bloc. However, the German attitude remained cool. Stresemann instructed his Envoy in Budapest to act like he did not know about the Hungarian proposition. The continued rejection of Hungarian overtures did not mean that Germany was not aware of the ethnographic injustices of the Trianon Peace of , and would not consider certain elements of Hungarian revisionist aims justified.
On the other hand, I have to state that this restlessness is justified. It was the gravest mistake to cut deep into Hungarian ethnic space. It is completely clear that one State could help another State, like one person helps another, if it is healthy and has fully recovered its strength.
Apart from revisionism, and differences in opinions about political collaboration, there were other problems in the German-Hungarian relationship. One of these was the collaboration of the German Bavarian and Hungarian far-right in the early s which was tolerated and to a certain extent supported by the Hungarian political leadership. The more democratic and more careful German leadership disapproved of this. In the second part of the s, the main issue in the bilateral relations was the question of German schools in Hungary.
The Bethlen government attempted to solve this problem in by organizing three types of schools. In type A, the language of instruction for all subjects was German, type B schools were bilingual, while in type C schools, German was taught as a foreign language.
In theory, this system would have been satisfactory to all. But, the government never funded type A and B schools to the extent it did type C ones. Accordingly, the number of type A schools reduced from 49 to 33 between and , type Bs from 73 to 55, while type Cs increased from to Bethlen also criticized the privileges German youth from Hungary enjoyed against other Hungarians in German state scholarships. He was also suspicious towards the extensive traveling of German youth to Hungary, and their growing networks there.
He did not consider this as a naturally developed relationship between German minorities and the German mother country, but as tools and an attempt of pan-German advance into Hungary.
In the s, Bethlen often referred to the dangers of a consequently German advance into Hungary. The promotion of a German-Hungarian revisionist collaboration, and criticism towards revisionist-expansionist Germany were apparently in contrast to each other.
On the level of rhetoric, this could be reconciled by overemphasizing the role of Hungarians in South-East Europe and with rosy viewpoints about German-Hungarian collaboration, but these two were irreconcilable. Apart from these, there were also other issues troubling German-Hungarian relations in the second half of the s: the critical voices of the German left-wing press towards the anti-democratic social structure and policies of the Hungarian government; the question of Burgenland; and the trade balance which became more and more favourable for Germany, but more and more un-favourable for Hungary.
The most important of these was the latter. Between and , the volume of German industrial imports into Hungary significantly exceeded Hungarian exports to Germany.
The primary reasons for this were very strict German sanitary regulations, and strongly protectionist German agrarian policy and the custom tariffs. By , the Hungarian export of cattle was severely diminished, and other meat exports were also significantly reduced.
Thus, from onward, the Hungarian government constantly lobbied for the revision of the commercial treaty, and the signing of a mutually beneficial new trade agreement. But, because Germany was satisfied with the situation, and also had no interest in improving political relations with Hungary, Berlin seemed to constantly postpone such decisions.
Preparatory talks remained in preliminary stages until The problem surrounding Burgenland was that Hungary never gave up hope to recover this territory, transferred to Austria in , which was mainly inhabited by Germans.
The Hungarian press often published articles about righteous Hungarian claims towards Austria, and Bethlen and his Foreign Ministers also made such comments. The Hungarian political elite hoped that if Hungary acknowledged the Anschluss , Germany would return Burgenland.
But, German political leadership considered the territory — with Austria — as part of Greater Germany. The initial friendship towards Germany, both in the Hungarian press and the public, was replaced by disappointment.
German diplomats delegated to the region, in particular German Minister in Budapest Hans Schoen —33 , had also perceived this change of tone. In order to strengthen these notions, Bethlen exaggerated French overtures to Hungary aimed at political cooperation.
In front of German diplomats, Bethlen pretended that he was very interested in this French policy. As a result of these, Hans Schoen recommended the extension of German-Hungarian trade and the invitation of Bethlen to Berlin.
As a result of these changes, German policy shifted towards an anti-French course. Regarding South-East Europe, this shift was manifested in the changing nature of German policy; after that, economic policy became more and more a political instrument. Thus, political ambivalence and neutrality had stopped.
The slogan, as German historian Dirk Stegman highlighted, once again became German dominated Mitteleuropa. Accordingly, German policy returned to pre-war multi-nation based principles. Heinrichbauer, a major coal industry figure, demanded the same. German policy, he noted, should aim to culturally and economically integrate these ten small countries into the German sphere with economic incentives. Regional economic difficulties, which the Great Depression further exacerbated, helped these German aims.
South-East European stability in the s was based on Western financial aid. Germany, also needing financial subvention, missed out on that opportunity.
Germany acquired a key position in this equation when it became a market for South-East European export, which these countries needed to pay back Western loans. During the crisis, when demand decreased worldwide, the German market became vital for South-East Europe.
Germany thus acquired an economic weapon, something it did not possess in the s. The first sign of the change of German intentions in South-East Europe was the surprise declaration of the German-Austrian customs union in March Concurrently, trade relations with South-East European countries were reviewed and reorganized. Accepting complaints coming from the region, and overcoming the resistance of the German agrarians, Germany signed trade agreements with Hungary on 27 June , and on 18 July with Romania.
These provided advantages for live animal export from both countries to Germany. Hungary and Romania returned the favour by providing custom preferences and reductions for German industrial imports. In , this German trade offensive met the rigid resistance of the victor powers of the Great War. Germany did not only have to step back on the customs union with Austria, but could not even ratify the preferential treaties.
Thus, between and , there was still a gulf between German ambitions in South-East Europe and political realities. The tool of any German defence against French and British plans was the instrumentalisation of the antagonism of the Central and South-East European states in the region. As well as the argument that the breaking of these ties was not in the interests of these countries either. In this respect, it based this policy on Sofia in the Balkans, and on Budapest in the Danubian basin.
This however, meant that the role of Hungary in German foreign policy had to be reviewed. The first sign of this re-evaluation was the invitation of Bethlen to Berlin in November Since the war, he was the first statesman from the region to enjoy the hospitality of the German government. His reception was tellingly cordial. The press, which previously struck a critical tone about him and his political system, now presented the territorial losses of Trianon and the achievements of his consolidating efforts, and referring to the centuries old special relationship it noted that both states belonged to the same camp in European politics.
The same tone described the comments of German politicians. What was more important than diplomatic niceties was that at this time the foreign policy of both countries were discussed to a great extent. The basis for Curtius was — and this was the declaration of the new foreign political doctrine — that in the most important questions, such as revisionism and disarmament, German policy went parallel with that of Hungary. Although he added that Germany did not contemplate the creation of a new alliance system, but hoped that in time, cooperation between Hungary and Germany would be closer.
The first sign of a German-Hungarian rapprochement was the signing of the commercial treaty, which did not come into force. In these, Hungary appeared as the natural ally and instrument of German penetration. This is the reason why we have to welcome and support the strengthening of Hungary. Of course, German and Hungarian interests did not fully coincide.
And finally, in the question of Burgenland, a collision was dormant between Hungary and Germany. Thus, long term German and Hungarian interests only coincided in Czechoslovakia. Instead, on 1 December , the policy towards Hungary was summed up as:. The differences in the specific aim have the consequence that the two countries cannot actively support each other. The increased political significance of Hungary coincided with the increase of its economic weight.
With this tendency, although still only in the sphere of planning, Budapest regained its role as a link between the Central European centre and the Balkans. The aforementioned December report noted:. Our special economic interests in Hungary exists because Hungary is situated in the heart of South-East Europe, in the part of Europe, which due to its location we believe would become the market of our industry.
Moreover, Hungary is directly adjacent to Austria and lays in the line of the trajectory of our natural economic expansion, and that any combination of economic collaboration depends on its collaboration. Thus, it is our crucial aim to deepen our economic relations with Hungary. The new policy of Germany towards Hungary was received amicably and with satisfaction by the leadership in Budapest.
The public, as well as Kozma, believed that German-French antagonism would be soon replaced by a German-Italian rapprochement, which would have automatically meant that Hungary would have gained more importance and that the subject of revision would become active again.
More recently, German and international historiographies contest this distinct periodisation. They point out that the two eras are much more interlinked than the earlier German post-war historiography admitted, largely preoccupied with the identity crisis of Germany and which called Nazism an error Betriebsunfall.
These new historiographies also point out that Nazi Germany also has its own distinctly separate eras.
Regarding our topic of the development of German policy towards South-East Europe, the questioning of this periodisation is perfectly valid.
South-East Europe was just as important for the Nazis as for the industrialists and foreign political leaders of the Weimar Republic between and The psychological and material reserves of this autarchic organisation will guarantee it advantage over other autarchies. The primary aim of Nationalist Socialist Germany — he noted before the Nazi accession to power — should be to penetrate Central and East Central Europe as a whole, including South-East Europe, and to economically link the national economies here to the German political and economic sphere.
The ideas of the traditional industrial and diplomatic and National Socialist elites about Mitteleuropa and South-East Europe had not only similarities, but also had dissimilarities. For the elites of the industry, the bank sector and the Foreign Ministry acquiring Mitteleuropa was a peaceful economic goal that would have respected national sovereignty in the region.
In this respect, this can be considered as the continuation of pre-war liberal imperialist aims. Clearly, such plans were similar to the pan-German ideologies of the early 20 th century. Despite the rescue efforts of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg and others, more than , Jews and 28, Roma are believed to have been deported after the German occupation of Hungary.
Operation Margarethe II was the name for the planned invasion of Romania by German forces should the Romanian government decide to surrender to the Soviet Union and switch sides. Find out more about Central European history in our new On this Day series. Previous Post. Next Post.
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